Initial questions
O Which type of model appears promising?
Representative Agents, Overlapping Generations, RBC models, ...
O In which macroeconomic context do we analyze the issues?
Small open economy, large open economy, 2-country model, n-country model; perfect competition?
O Exogenous and endogenous variables
Tax payers' honesty (degree of tax evasion), government preferences, international tax cooperation O How to make tax rates endogenous Public spending in the utililty function, public spending as a factor of production, income distribution in the utility function The tax elasticity ε t ƒ of tax evasion ƒ is defined as
Presumption:
If ƒ is unelastic to the tax rate, the government will raise the tax rate to recapture some of the lost revenues caused by tax evasion.
As ε t ƒ , increases, raising tax rates become less attractive because higher tax revenues on declared income will be increasingly offset by even more tax evasion.
impact of bank secrecy laws depends on ε t ƒ Endogenous tax evasion: mechanical approach Household benefit of tax evasion:
Household cost of tax evasion:
(ii):
Costs that are linear in f imply a stepwise tax evasion function. This suggests inelastic f with respect to tax differential and thus yields same results as when f is exogenous.
Endogenous Tax
Costs that are quadratic in f imply a linear tax evasion function. This suggests results to be similar to the case when tax evasion was endogenized in a mechanical fashion. Implies following choice of fraction of wealth f* held abroad: Endogenous Tax Evasion: Optimizing Approach (2) ( )
Model is calibrated so that all f lines intersect at f = 0.1. All MC functions yield the same share of assets held abroad, but different tax elasticites.
Fraction of wealth f* held abroad:
White bars show outcomes with bank secrecy laws Colored bars show outcomes with bank secracy laws Endogenous Tax Evasion: Optimizing Approach (2a)
